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Continuing our conversations with public intellectuals across Europe on the
causes and effects of the crisis, Euro Crisis in the Press talks to Professor
George Pagoulatos, advisor to former Greek PM Papademos and member
of the Board of Directors in Greece’s foremost defense and foreign policy
institute, ELIAMEP. Professor Pagoulatos argues that muddling through the
European crisis is no longer enough and that more ambitious integration is
needed for catastrophic disintegration to be averted. In the case of the
Greek austerity programme, he regrets that a more symmetric distribution of
the adjustment cost across a more extensive time period was a road not
taken by the European partners largely due to the country’s credibility deficit.
Professor Pagoulatos also alerts to the rise of populist and extremist forces
in Europe and calls for a relentless judicial prosecution of the particularly
egregious neo-Nazi phenomenon in Greece. Finally, he deems that a way
out of the crisis requires national-level fiscal responsibility, adjustment, and
reforms in the South, together with greater solidarity, burden-sharing and
integration across the Eurozone.
 
Professor Pagoulatos, there is little doubt that Europe is undergoing an unprecedented crisis. The crisis
itself can be seen as having multiple dimensions: a financial crisis of the Eurozone and the Euro as a
common currency, an institutional EU-wide crisis, a crisis of the European post-war social and economic
model or even a European identity crisis. From your point of view, what is the most important aspect of the
crisis?
Clearly, this is a crisis which is actually being felt on the ground, not just by way of its macroeconomic implications
or its impact on balance sheets or the EU inter-institutional balance, but by its disturbing capacity to affect people’s
lives – be that unemployment queues or severe income and welfare deterioration, or deep insecurity about the
future. But attempting to take a step back, I would say that perhaps a most important aspect of this crisis is that it is
testing the extreme limits of the capacity of EU institutions and Eurozone member states to devise collectively
beneficial “win-win” compromise solutions that can overcome this European crisis and move integration forward.
This time around, muddling-though will not be enough, more ambitious integration is needed for catastrophic
disintegration to be averted. This crisis has opened a wide rift between the Eurozone “North” and “South”, an
economic, political, and mental rift. A “grand bargain”, an historical compromise solution among Eurozone member
states, that will make the euro sustainable for the next generation, is not inconceivable, as the four EU Presidents
proposals demonstrate. But it will be harder than ever in the past to achieve it. This is an existential challenge for
Europe as we have known it.
The widely shared public discourse in the media pits the proponents of austerity against those who call for
growth-oriented policies. Do you think this is a real dilemma? What policy responses would be most
appropriate?
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Greece entered the 2009-10 crisis suffering total inability to finance its debt, a huge primary budget deficit over 10%
GDP, an unsustainable current account deficit in the 15% GDP area, and a long period of reform inertia that had
created an urgent need for long-delayed, far-reaching structural reforms. Greece entered the crisis with an
unsustainable debt-driven growth model, based on a borrowing bubble, an overbloated non-tradables sector, and
excessive levels of consumption, public and private. All these needed to change fast because they were not
sustainable. The deficits had to shrink, far-reaching structural reforms had to be finally implemented, and the growth
model had to become more export-oriented. It is irresponsible to say that such large scope of adjustment could have
taken place without austerity. But the problem was that the partners and creditors pressed for an extremely harsh
and frontloaded austerity program, when adjustment should have been spread over a more extensive time period to
moderate its recessionary impact. To a certain extent this was the inevitable result of Greece’s third deficit, the
credibility deficit.
The more appropriate response would have been: (a) more growth-friendly fiscal consolidation targets; (b) a more
frontloaded emphasis on structural reforms, with technical assistance in implementing them (e.g. in going after tax
havens abroad); the Greek governments of the last 3 years bear significant responsibility for dragging their feet on
some of these reforms; (c) most importantly, a set of EU offsetting measures, of a countercyclical nature (investment
funding, SME finance, employment support, etc) targeted urgently to Greece and the other peripherals facing Great
Depression-like levels of unemployment. These should have aimed at moderating the recessionary impact of
adjustment, at a time when no countercyclical measures were possible at a national level. Growth cannot be
attained and sustained without macroeconomic stability and structural reforms; but recovery in the South will be
postponed indefinitely if the Eurozone does not begin acting more like a single economy: reducing fragmentation
and country-risk for the peripherals, implementing a more symmetric distribution of the adjustment cost, and moving
faster to banking and fiscal integration.
Europe shares a currency but is socially, culturally and politically heterogeneous. On account of the crisis
some even speak about a growing and perhaps irreparable rift between the European north and south. Do
you think the crisis will exacerbate these divisions or rather strengthen European solidarity?
Crises in the past have often served as opportunities for accelerated integration. I am very concerned as to the
political will, on the part of both core and peripheral Eurozone member-states, to make this grand leap forward.
Instead of bringing European peoples closer together, this crisis has widened the rifts and revived national
stereotypes we thought Europe had managed to bury behind. I hope this is not irreversible. There is a strengthening
of a feeling of solidarity among peoples, and there are some European leaders with a strong understanding that we
can only exit this crisis if we (Europeans) move forward together in greater unity. But there is also a re-emergence of
populists, bigots and demagogues, and even an awakening of nationalisms. And economic crises tend to make
societies more nationally introvert. It is still too early to tell which tendency will carry the day.
How would you assess the effects of the crisis in Greece in comparison to those in Spain, Italy or Portugal?
Does the crisis put a strain on democratic institutions and how should extremism be dealt with?
The socioeconomic effects of the crisis have been more pronounced in Greece, if we look both at the depth of the
recession (loss of one fourth of the 2008 GDP) and the levels of unemployment, comparable only to those of Spain.
However Greece has also been exceptional in one additional way, the appalling rise of a neo-Nazi party of
immigrant-beating thugs, Golden Dawn, which is among the ugliest versions of extreme right that any European
country has seen over the last few decades. Such extremism must be dealt with through a united stance of the
entire socio-political spectrum against it, and also through a systematic and relentless judicial prosecution of its wide
range of illegal activities.
Do you see any ground for the development of a common approach to mutual challenges among the
countries of the European south?
 The countries of the European south have completed the largest part of the huge adjustment effort undertaken
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since 2010, which is evident in the figures. Greece for example has reduced its structural budget deficit by almost
17 percentage points of GDP (from a structural budget deficit of 14.8% in 2009 to a surplus of 2% in 2013 –
European Commission, Spring 2013), having now one of the best structural budget balance positions in the
Eurozone. Similar is the progress in terms of reducing unit labour costs in Greece and other peripherals. Such
scope of extremely painful adjustment enhances political bargaining power. It allows the countries of the Euro South
to coordinate their action in demanding a more symmetric Eurozone response to the crisis (an investment stimulus
and employment support to the South, combined with a demand stimulus to the North) and faster steps towards real
banking, fiscal and eventually economic integration in the Eurozone. The crisis requires national-level fiscal
responsibility, adjustment, and reforms in the South, together with greater solidarity, burden-sharing and integration
across the Eurozone.
__________
George Pagoulatos is Professor of European Politics and Economy at the Department of International & European
Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics & Business
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